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Re´sume´
Sans nier l’importance de l’information asymme´trique, cet article soutient que
le rationnement du cre´dit peut surgir aussi par l’impossibilite´ pour le preteˆur a`
classifier les demandes de preˆts dans des categories approprie´es. Bien que e´vident
quand des nouvelles technologies ou des nouveaux arrangements institutionnels
e´mergent, la manque de categories approprie´es peut affecter chaque demande de
preˆt, faisant le rationnement du cre´dit plus commun que retenu avant.
Abstract
Without denying the importance of asymmetric information, this article pur-
ports the view that credit rationing may also originate from a lender’s inability
to classify loan applications into proper risk categories. Although particularly
prominent when novel technologies or novel institutional arrangements arise, lack
of appropriate categories may affect any request of money lending, making credit
rationing much more widespread than previously thought.
Keywords: Credit Rationing, Complexity, Risk Categories, Internal Rating
Systems, Deciding not to Decide, Problem Decomposition.
JEL Classification: D81, D89, E51, G21, G24
1
1 Introduction
It is well known that credit is not conceded to those applicants who would accept
the highest interest rate. Rather, it is conceded to those who offer the most reliable
prospects that the debt will be repaid. In fact, since applicants may not disclose the
true features of their projects, by increasing the interest rate banks would screen
for riskier, less profitable projects. Thus, economic theory views credit rationing
as an instance of asymmetric information.
Interestingly, practitioners tend to stress another aspect. Giving for granted
that loan applicants typically hide some information, they are rather concerned
with the content of the information that they provide. Specifically, they are con-
cerned about the soundness of the projects that they should finance and the ability
of their proponents to carry them out. In the limit, one may mention a popular
guide for venture capitalists listing such things as a deprived childhood, an absent
father, a strong mother and a sense of guilt for having not lived up to parents’
expectations as the hallmarks of successful entrepreneurs [53].
Be these features relevant or not, the crucial issue is that practitioners want to
know whether potential borrowers know what they are doing. After discounting
for the fact that loan applicants portray a rosy picture of their enterprise, they want
to focus on the details of the projects they are asked to finance.
These details may be quite easy to specify if the project is presented by a
well-acquainted firm that is expanding on a stable technology. On the contrary,
assessing a project may be a very difficult task when money is demanded for an
enterprise of a novel kind, one that has never been undertaken before.
Investments often involve novel technologies, and possibly the creation of
novel institutions and consumption habits [38]. Being novel, no objective prob-
ability distribution of their success can be measured. Thus, even if information
asymmetries would not exist, banks officials would still have a hard time trying to
understand whether a potential borrower is a visionary business man or just a mad
man.
Distinguishing visionary business men from mad men is a matter of having
the right classification criteria, and this problem adds to that of asymmetric in-
formation. Even if all information is available to the lender, (s)he may classify a
competent business man with a great idea as a mad man. If this happens, credit
rationing occurs even if information is perfectly symmetric.
Indeed, credit rationing has been found to be strongest when innovative tech-
nologies are involved [32] [3] [4]. Some theorists have objected that the stock
market, with its variety of investors, should be able to finance the most innova-
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tive enterprises [1]. Yet in practice stock markets are oriented by rating agencies
whose classification criteria are so stiff that the most innovative firms are forced to
hide their best features in order to be positively valued [60]. The problem is that
both banks and financial markets need some form of classification of investment
projects, and since classification rests on past experience, innovative projects that
do not fit conventional wisdom have a hard time. Simply, bank officials do not
lend money for projects that they do not understand, and rating agencies cannot
do better.
Several economists have stressed that the inability to classify qualitatively
novel projects is at least as important for credit rationing as information asym-
metries [19] [20] [50] [58] [10]. It is an issue that has remained quite marginal
hitherto, though it may become paramount in a near future. In fact, the Bank of In-
ternational Settlements (BIS) has purported a link between liquidity requirements
and the riskiness of loans, and this link is based on internal rating systems [7].
Thus, classification criteria have an impact not only on the decision to concede a
loan, but also on the total amount of loans that banks are allowed to concede.
This article attempts to understand classification processes and their possible
dynamics. Any lending institution is concerned, including banks, venture capi-
talists, capital markets and rating agencies with respect to bonds, and others. For
simplicity, the word “bank” will be eventually employed as a shorthand for “lend-
ing institution” henceforth.
Section (2) reports on qualitative and quantitative empirical evidence on inter-
nal classification systems. Section (3) illustrates how credit rationing may occur
if lender and borrower classify projects according to different criteria. Section (4)
presents a mathematical model. Section (5) explores the processes by which clas-
sification systems may be adapted to a changing environment. Finally, section (6)
concludes.
2 Empirical Evidence
The process of classifying loan applications into risk categories is at the very core
of banking. Traditionally, it has been hidden by strict secrecy. However, since
a few years the BIS is searching ways for adapting liquidity requirements to the
riskiness of loan portfolios. Consequently, a certain amount of empirical research
has been carried out and some results have been published.
According to these investigations, banks make use of categories for the projects
which they decide to finance (the so-called “pass-grades”) as well as for the
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projects which they decide not to finance (the so-called “fail-grades”). Categories
for projects that are not financed are fewer than the categories for projects that are
financed.
Let us focus on categories for projects that are financed. Considering that we
are dealing with the most jealously protected information of banking, any piece of
even anecdotal evidence should be observed with care, so even scant information
will be reported. The available information is presented with respect to three
aspects.
First, one may ask how far in the past the judgement is stretched. It is obvious
that classification is made depending on past performance, but we may wish to
know whether it is a matter of months or decades.
A study carried out by the BIS [6] collected the answer “three years or more”,
but only from a fraction of the thirty banks that were interviewed. In a public
declaration, an official of a large Italian bank also spoke of “three years” [30].
Indeed, a guide for practitioners recommends to focus on the “previous few years”
[17]. On the whole, we get an indication in the order of a few years, possibly more
than one or two but certainly less than ten.
Secondly, one may want to know the number of risk categories employed by
banks. Several studies have shed light on this issue.
In 1995, English and Nelson collected data from 114 U.S. banks. They found
that 85% of them had a rating system and that the average number of risk cate-
gories ranged from 3.4 for smaller banks to 4.8 for larger banks [12] [24]. In 1997,
Treacy and Carey carried out a research among the 50 largest U.S. banks, finding
that the number of risk categories ranged from 2 to the low 20s, with an average of
3-4 [55]. In 1998 Weber, Krahnen and Voßman interviewed the four largest Ger-
man banks and found numbers ranging from 5 to 8 [57]. Similarly, De Laurentis
found out that the five largest Italian banks in the years 1996-98 were using 6-7
risk categories [39]. In 1999, the Bank of International Settlements examined a
sample of over thirty banks, generally large and internationally diversified, finding
numbers between 2 and 20 [6]. Finally, by interviewing three specialised German
banks in 2001 Norden found that the number of risk categories was 6, 9 and 14,
respectively [45].
Figure (1) reports the distribution of the number of risk categories found by
the BIS. The number of risk categories ranges between 2 and 20. Thus, this range
includes the numbers found by other studies.
In their empirical study of 1997, Treacy and Carey revisited older investi-
gations. They came to the conclusion that a decade earlier the number of risk
categories might have been smaller, in the order of three if they were in place at
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Figure 1: The distribution of the number of risk categories among thirty large
international banks. By courtesy of the c©Bank of International Settlements [6]
all [55]. They remarked that the number of risk categories increased both with
time and with the size of banks, but not indefinitely. According to their suggested
interpretation, a ceiling may exist due to a trade-off between the advantages of
having a large number of categories in order to run automatized systems that de-
tect problem loans on the one hand, and the difficulties posed by large number of
categories to boundedly rational decision-makers on the other hand.
Notably, banks that use a very large number of categories generally derive
them by adding a “+” or a “-” to a smaller set of categories. For instance, a system
with 6 categories can be easily turned into a system of 12 categories by requiring
bank officials to specify whether the loan is in the upper end of the category (with
a “+”) or in the lower end (with a “-”). By doing so, human operators can approach
the classification problem in two steps [55].
Finally, it is most important to know the criteria by which loan applications are
classified. In particular, this is important in order to formulate guidelines along
which the classification criteria may be changed with time.
According to several empirical studies, it appears that both “hard” and “soft”
aspects are considered by banks, though this distinction is blurred by the fact that
even “soft” aspects are translated into numerical values [13] [6] [31]. A possible
list of the aspects involved may be the following:
1. Loan specification in terms of collaterals and terms of payment [11] [39]
[6] [46]. In particular, securities are often a condition for evaluating other
aspects [17].
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2. Financial indicators [57] [39] [6], eventually used by automatized proce-
dures such as the Z-score [2] or neural networks [36]. For very small busi-
nesses, the consumer credit score of the business owner is employed [9].
For venture capitalists, the liquidity of assets is also important [43].
3. The technology employed by the project, to be evaluated with respect to
the industries on which it is expected to impact [41] [57]. In particular,
marginal firms in mature sectors are often regarded as sources of financial
distress [17]. By contrast, proprietary or otherwise protected technologies
and products are positively valued [43].
4. Psychological features of the applying executive/entrepreneur and quality
of the management team, to be considered in conjunction with the structure
of the industry where the applicant operates [8] [51] [41] [57] [6]. Man-
agement quality may be inferred by the absence of litigations, suppliers
satisfaction and managers succession plans [17]. In high-tech start-ups, the
willingness of scientists to give up managing positions to professional man-
agers is highly valued [5].
5. Reliability of the information provided by the applicant. Reliability is in-
creased by a lasting acquaintance [23] [39] but may eventually be disrupted
by signals of increasing information asymmetries such as changes of ac-
counting procedures or a growing reluctance to provide information [18].
Long-term relations have been found to integrate, not to substitute collater-
als [46].
6. Information provided by the stock market and its rating agencies, or by
customers and suppliers of the applicant [11] [39] [6]. For firms with over
25% of operations abroad, the country risk as evaluated by rating agencies
may be included as well [17].
It has been observed that several banks are shifting from rating systems based
on one single set of categories to rating systems based on several sets of categories,
each for a different aspect of a loan application. The most common distinction is
between aspects that pertain to the applicant (issues 2, 4 and 5 above) and aspects
that pertain to the particular project for which a loan is requested (issues 1, 3 and 6
above) [55] [6] [39]. However, it appears that some banks are moving even further,
evaluating several or all of the above aspects separately or, in some cases, even
subdividing them according to their components [57]. By having different bank
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officials specialised in one or a few aspects of rating, a bank is better able to detect
warning signs that involve only one aspect. Eventually, a thorough examination
of all the aspects may be undertaken at a later stage [39].
This suggests that the number of aspects that are considered separately has a
huge impact on lending decisions. The more aspects are considered separately, the
easier it is for a bank to detect problem loans. However, too subtle categories may
impair the evaluation of innovative projects that cut across the borders of existing
categories.
In § (5) we shall examine the consequences of having multiple aspects to be
considered in separate sets of categories. In the ensuing § (3), credit rationing is
examined in the simple case of one single set of risk categories, ordered from “low
risk” to “high risk”. In this simple setting, which is still a realistic description of
the functioning of many lending institutions, each category refers to a different
class of risk though each category encompasses all of the above aspects.
3 Classification Failure
This section illustrates a procedure for modelling credit rationing due to a bank’s
inability to classify the qualitative features of loan applications in proper cate-
gories. Since credit rationing due to classification failure is complementary to
credit rationing due to asymmetric information, they should be described by one
single model. Thus, this section begins with recalling the basic model of credit
rationing due to asymmetric information.
Formalisations of credit rationing make use of the expressions “classes of risk”
and “classes of return”. The empirical litterature mentioned in § (2) employed the
expression “risk categories”, which is often more appropriate to our discourse.
Henceforth, the expressions “classes of risk” and “risk categories” will be used as
synonyms.
The basic model of credit rationing with asymmetric information begins with
the observation that, by increasing the interest rate, the least risky loans drop out of
a bank’s portfolio. Thus, it is not convenient for banks to select loan applications
by means of the interest rate. Rather, banks should segment the market classifying
loan applications in a discrete number of classes of risk. To each class of risk, a
different interest rate applies.
For interest rates r < r1, all projects are proposed to the bank. Thus, by in-
creasing r ∈ (0,r1) the bank makes higher profits. However, for r ≥ r1 the least
risky projects are no longer proposed. Thus, at r = r1 the expected return to the
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bank drops. It increases again with r for r1 ≤ r < r2, to drop again at r = r2 and so
on up to rn. Thus, it is convenient for the bank to segment the market by classify-
ing loan applicants into n classes of risk applying a different interest rate to each
class.
The highest interest rate, rn, does not necessarily coincide with the interest rate
that would obtain by equating demand and supply. In fact, if the bank suspects
that the equilibrium interest rate would only attract swindlers, it may not concede
any loan at that rate. Thus in general it is rn ≤ r∗, where r∗ is the interest rate that
obtains at market equilibrium.
Since r1 < r2 < .. . < rn, for ∀i < n it is ri < r∗. Thus, at least to the applicants
borrowing at ri < rn, credit is rationed. The ultimate reason is that loan applicants
typically hide information to banks, and that banks are aware of this information
asymmetry.
Note that credit is allocated by classifying the projects waiting for a loan into n
categories ordered by increasing risk and characterized by increasing interest rates
r1 < r2 < .. . < rn. Thus, a decision about the interest rates is made at the same
time a loan applicant is classified in a risk category. Henceforth, risk categories
will be identified with their interest rate.
Let us now consider credit rationing due to classification failure. From projects
classified in risk category ri, a return Ri is expected. In general, the higher the risk
(and the interest rate), the higher the expected return. 1
Let R1 < R2 < .. . < Rn denote the returns expected from financed projects.
The bank financed these projects expecting a one-to-one correspondence between
classes of risk and classes of returns, as in figure (2).
Suppose that the bank did not correctly classify some projects, for instance
because the projects entailed some technological innovation that the bank officials
were not able to understand, or because institutional or political changes occurred,
that bank officials were not able to foresee. Then, some projects may yield a
much lower (or higher) return than expected. Thus, the one-to-one connections of
figure (2) may turn into one-to-many connections, as in figure (3).
A bank that is facing a map as in figure (3) understands that it should revise its
classification criteria until a one-to-one map as in figure (2) is established again.
Returns that turn out to be higher than expected do not pose big problems, but
returns that turn out to be lower than expected do.
1By “expected return” we do not mean an expected value where several possible returns are
weighted by their probability. Simply, a project is supposed to yield a return in the future. This is
what is here called “expected return”.
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Figure 3: If some projects obtain very different returns from those that were ex-
pected, then the causal relationships from classes of risk to classes of returns may
become one-to-many.
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During all the time where there are one-to-many connections between classes
of risk and classes of return, a bank is unable to assign a project to a proper class
of risk. Therefore, it may not concede credit altogether.
Let us assume that the applicant receives the same information as the bank,
but that he classifies it differently. For instance, the loan applicant may have a
detailed knowledge of a novel technology that enables her to create a new market,
or that she has so detailed a knowledge of an economy in turmoil that she is able to
identify a profitable business opportunity. The bank, with its rough classifications,
has a one-to-many map as in figure (3). The loan applicant, with her unique
knowledge of the details, is able to draw the lines that distinguish good business
from bad business, so her map is one-to-one as in figure (2). If the loan applicant
has a one-to-one mapping while the bank has a one-to-many mapping, then credit
is rationed. Appendix (A) tells a real story where this kind of differential mapping
occurred.
Note that this mechanism did not require asymmetric information. Asymmet-
ric information may be there to make things worse, but credit rationing is inherent
in the fact that banks generally have coarser classification criteria than applicants.
This difference may be small in quiet times, where banks may learn how to infer
the relevant features from certain indicators, but it may be large at times where
technological or institutional novelties emerge.
The above account assumed rationality of both the bank and the applicant, in
the sense that both employ their expertise rationally to make sense of available
information. The issue is that, having different expertise, they may come out with
different maps of the same information.
The above account does not hold if the applicant is not rational. If the applicant
did not develop a one-to-one map because he is a smart businessman, but just
because he is a mad man, then the bank has good reasons to refuse a loan. This is
still credit rationing, but not of a kind to be avoided.
Finally, the case has to be mentioned where the would-be applicant, just as the
bank, is unable to develop a one-to-one map. The would-be applicant, just as the
bank, has a one-to many map. In this case no credit rationing takes place, simply
because this person does not apply for a loan.
4 A Mathematical Model
Since in our case the decision not to grant a loan depends on detecting unexpected
novelties, the recognition of a one-to-many map must be based on a restricted
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number of recent observations. Let m ∈N denote the number of past time inter-
vals upon which bank officers evaluate the appropriateness of their causal map.
Henceforth, m will be called the memory of bank officers. It is obviously m ≥ 0,
with m = 0 in the special case when bank officers look only at current occurrences.
Let us define the complexity of the decision-making problem as a measure of
the extent to which the connections that occurred in the last m time intervals are
intertwined [27]. The ensuing account is an excerpt of more technical publications
[15], [25], [26]. For technical background and an example of the concepts and
methods employed henceforth, see Appendix (B).
The structure of connections between classes of risk and classes of return can
be usefully subsumed by means of a simplicial complex. This is composed by
connected simplices, one for each class of risk. The vertices of each simplex are
the classes of return to which a particular class of risk is connected.
If the connections between classes of risk and classes of return are one-to-one
as in figure (2), simplices are isolated points so no simplicial complex exists. In
this case, complexity is zero.
On the contrary, if at least two simplices have at least one vertex in common,
a simplicial complex exists and complexity is greater than zero. For instance, the
connections of figure (3) corresponds to a simplicial complex made of n simplices
r1,r2, . . .rn. The simplex r1 is a segment whose vertices are R1 and Rn. The sim-
plex r2 is a segment whose vertices are R1 and R2. More intertwined connections
may be represented by simplicial complexes composed by many more simplices,
possibly of higher dimension.
Two simplices are connected if they have at least one common vertex. Two
simplices that have no common vertex may nonetheless be connected by a chain
of simplices having common vertices with one another. Let us say that simplices
ri ′ and ri ′′ are q−connected if there exists a chain of simplices {ru,rv, . . .rw} such
that q = min{li ′ u, luv, . . . lwi ′′}≥ 0, where lxy is the dimension of the common face
between rx and ry. In particular, two contiguous simplices are connected at level
q if they have a common face of dimension q.
Let us consider the common faces between simplices and let us focus on the
face of largest dimension. Let Q denote the dimension of this face. It is Q ≤
n− 1, where Q = n− 1 means that there are at least two overlapping simplices
that include all possible vertices.
Let us partition the set of simplices that compose the simplicial complex ac-
cording to their connection level q. In general, for ∀ q there exist several classes
of simplices such that the simplices belonging to a class are connected at q. Let
us introduce a structure vector s whose q-th component sq denotes the number of
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disjoint classes of simplices that are connected at level q. Since q = 0,1, . . .Q,
vector s has Q+1 rows.
In order to avoid repetitions in the calculus of complexity, a class of simplices
connected at level q is not considered to be connected at levels q−1, q−2, . . . 0
as well. For instance, let simplices r1 and r2 be connected at level q = 2, and
let simplex r3 be connected with r2 at level q = 1. Then, {r1,r2} is a class of
simplices connected at q = 2 and {r1,r2,r3} is a class of simplices connected at
q = 1. However, {r1,r2} is not a class of simplices connected at level q = 0.
The following measure for the complexity of a simplicial complex has been
proposed by Casti [15] and improved by Fioretti [25], [26]:
C (F ; m,n) =
{
0 if all connections are one-to-one
∑Qq=0 q+1sq otherwise
(1)
where the sum extends only to the terms such that sq 6= 0. Finally, it is stipulated
that the complexity of two or more disconnected simplicial complexes is the sum
of their complexities.
The complexity seen by a bank official who is evaluating the reliability of
an attribution of classes of risk depends on the observed connections between
classes of risk and classes of return, which realise out of an unknown stochastic
distribution F . It also depends on m, the memory length, as well as on n, the
number of classes of risk. While F is unknown by the bank official, m and n are
parameters under her control.
Expression (1) takes account of two opposite effects. On the one hand, the
numerator increases with the number of connections between classes of risk and
classes of return. Thus, it simply measures the extent to which novel connec-
tions confuse the causal map. On the other hand, the denominator of (1) makes
complexity decrease if cross-connections are separated in distinct groups.
Complexity (1) increases monotonically with both m and n. On the contrary,
its dependence on F is more interesting.
Let us consider the simple case where cross connections occur stochastically
as a fraction f of all connections. Thus, C(F ; m,n) becomes C( f ; m,n). Consid-
ering the empirical evidence of § (2), m = 3 and n = 10 appears an appropriate
choice. Figure (4) illustrates the ensuing values of complexity with f increasing
from 0 to 100% of total connections.
Figure (4) makes clear that complexity is different from “randomness”, “disor-
der” or any other property of the environment. Rather, it is a subjective evaluation.
Up to a fraction of cross-connections of about 35-40%, a bank official may judge
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Figure 4: Complexity as a function of f , with m = 3, n = 10. All values have been
averaged over 1,000,000 steps.
that the more disordered the connections, the more “complex” the environment.
Beyond this threshold, cross-connections are so many that the bank official may
judge that it is not worth to distinguish among projects whose returns are totally
unpredictable. Consequently, the business environment is less “complex” for her.
More precisely, complexity approaches n for very high values of f .
However, things change if cross-connections do not extend very far. Let us
assume that projects in a class of risk ri may turn out to yield a return in the
interval Ri−δ ≤ Ri ≤ Ri+δ (R1 ≤ Ri ≤ Ri+δ if i < δ, Ri−δ ≤ Ri ≤ Rn if i > n− δ).
The previous case obtains if δ = n− 1. If δ = 0 no cross-connections occur, so
complexity is zero. In all intermediate cases some cross-connections do occur, but
they are localised in a spot of radius δ around each ri.
Figure (5) illustrates simulations with δ = 1,2, . . .9, all other parameters as in
figure (4). Cross-connections occur with increasing probability, but only within
an interval specified by the parameter δ.
In figure (5) we see that if cross-connections are sufficiently localised, confu-
sion between causal attributions of returns to classes of risk never grows so large
that a decision-maker may give up the hope to improve classification criteria —
i.e. complexity never decreases. It reaches plateaus, however. These may sug-
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Figure 5: Complexity as a function of f , with m = 3, n = 10, for δ = 1,2, . . .9.
With δ = 9, the case of figure (4) obtains. All results have been averaged over
1,000,000 steps.
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gest bank officials to accept as unavoidable a certain level of imperfection of their
classification criteria.
Let us assume bounded rationality and let us think of bank officials as sat-
isfycing decision-makers who make a decision if a relevant variable exceeds a
threshold. Since complexity measures the unreliability of classification criteria as
it is subjectively evaluated by bank officials, it is sensible to assume that they may
decide to revise these criteria whenever C > C, where C is a proper threshold. So
long C remains greater than C, loans are not conceded, no matter which interest
rate the applicant is willing to pay.
The threshold C may depend on past experiences, market specificities and
institutional arrangements. It may change with time, though at a lower time scale
than C.
Eventually, the above description may be duplicated across markets or geo-
graphical area. For instance, a bank may carry out separate classifications of loan
applications in different industries or regions.
5 Revising the Classification Criteria
If complexity is greater than zero, bank officials set out to revise the criteria by
which they classify loan applications. If bank officials employ one single set
of risk categories r1,r2, . . .rn, the process of revising the classification criteria is
largely carried out informally in their minds. Little can be said about it, either
because it is tacit knowledge or because explicit rules are eventually covered by
secrecy.
However, the empirical investigations reported in § (2) revealed that banks
are moving towards an arrangement of the classification process where different
aspects are considered separately (financial indicators, management quality etc.).
Allegedly, the reason is that if one single aspect becomes problematic, a thorough
evaluation of all aspects of a loan is carried out.
Suppose that N aspects are considered, denoted by an index i = 1,2, . . . N.
The model expounded in § (4) can be applied to each separate aspect yielding N
complexity values C1,C2, . . .CN .
So long all Cis are zero (or below a pre-defined threshold), the classification
criteria are not doubted. A loan application may be classified in different classes
of risk for each different aspect, and the overall class of risk may result out of a
weighted average of the classes of risk in each aspect.
As we learned in § (2), several banks have shifted from rating systems based
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on one single set of categories to rating systems based on several sets of cate-
gories, each for a different aspect of a loan application. By having different bank
officials specialised in one or a few aspects of rating, a bank is better able to detect
warning signs that involve only one aspect. Thus, if ∃ i such that Ci > 0 (or above
a pre-defined threshold) the classification criteria are doubted. Bank officials must
engage in a re-definition of classification criteria in such a way that all mappings
between classes of risk and interest rates are one-to-one so all Cis are zero.
The collection of empirical testimonies reported in § (2) identified a maximum
of six broad aspects, depending in their turn on finer sub-aspects. For instance,
the aspect “financial indicators” may be broken down in a number of accounting
variables, and the same holds for technologies, management features and so on. If
complexity is greater than zero (or above a pre-defined threshold), bank officials
may need to re-distribute sub-aspects in order to change the content of the aspects
that generated too high a complexity. By doing so, the classification criteria of the
categories defined on the aspects involved may change.
An example is in order. No empirical evidence is available concerning the sub-
aspects employed by banks, but a good deal of information is available regarding
the classification criteria employed by venture capitalists. Although this is a very
particular case of money lending institution, its logic is not different from that of
the other ones.
Let us consider aspect (3) in § (2), labelled “The technology employed by the
project, to be evaluated with respect to the industries on which it is expected to
impact”. From the main studies of the classification criteria employed by venture
capitalists [56] [40] [41] [37] [33] [29] [48] [44] [47] [16] [43], one can excerpt
that venture capitalists declare that the above aspect is composed by the following
sub-aspects:
1. The product is protected from imitation by the law or by its technical fea-
tures;
2. Uniqueness of product (the product has very imperfect substitutes);
3. The product has been developed up to the stage of a functioning prototype;
4. The product has a demonstrated market acceptance;
5. Availability of raw materials and stability of their price;
6. Easiness of procurement of specialised labour;
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7. Availability of specialised equipment;
8. The venture will stimulate an existing market or create a new market;
9. This market has a high expected growth rate;
10. There is a well-developed distribution system;
11. Favourable geographical location and good export potential.
There is quite a clear distinction between aspects 1 to 7, which pertain to the
product, and the aspects 8 to 11, which pertain to its market. Thus, venture capi-
talists generally decompose the aspect “The technology employed by the project,
to be evaluated with respect to the industries on which it is expected to impact”
into two aspects: “characteristics of product”, entailing sub-aspects 1 to 7, and
”characteristics of market”, entailing sub-aspects 8 to 11. So venture capitalists
distinguish two aspects where banks distinguish only one.
This means that venture capitalists have remarked that, in their fields of ac-
tivity, technological considerations can be safely decoupled from market consid-
erations. In the terms of our model this means that, in this case, by subdividing
this aspect in two, the correspondence between risk categories and interest rates
in closer to be one-to-one in at least one of the two derived aspects. Other money-
lending institutions, in other contexts, may find it useful to group aspects together;
others still, may find it useful to re-distribute sub-aspects among existing aspects.
The issue is that of arranging sub-aspects into aspects in such a way that while
sub-aspects are strongly related to one another within the aspect in which they are
included, aspects are largely independent of one another. Only if this can be done,
aspects can be considered independently of one another when deciding whether
a loan can be conceded. It is an instance of problem decomposition [54] [21]
[22], where the problem of classifying loan applicants into proper classes of risk
can be eased if the features of the applicant can be considered separately along
nearly-independent aspects.
The properties of problem decomposition have been investigated by means of
computer simulations where a “problem”, consisting of guessing a string of num-
bers created with some rule, could be “solved” by mutating blocks of variables of
different lengths. This problem is akin to the Rubik cube, where the goal of having
all squares on each face of a uniform colour must be reached by moving blocks
of squares. However, the Rubik cube forces players to decompose the problem
by means of sub-problems entailing as many squares as there are on a face of the
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cube. In these simulations the problem could be decomposed into blocks of dif-
ferent size [28] [42] [14]. Clearly, a solution to the problem of guessing numbers
exists, and the computer eventually finds it after a sufficiently large number of tri-
als. The issue is whether it finds it within a reasonable time, and how fast it finds it
depending on the size of the blocks into which the problem has been decomposed.
These simulations are relevant, because they admit a simple mapping into our
context. In fact, decomposing a problem by means of blocks of different size
corresponds to having sub-aspects that can be grouped into a certain number of
aspects. The issue is finding the optimal number of aspects and, most importantly,
what sub-aspects they should entail in order to arrive at a set of risk categories
that enables a bank to draw a set of (nearly) one-to-one correspondences with
classes of return. We may want to know whether a bank can arrive at such a set of
correspondences, and how fast.
The results of these simulations can be summarised as follows:
• If the decomposition is coarser than the optimal one, then the solution is
found, but it is found later. In our context, this means that too few sub-
aspects may slow down the process of arranging aspects into categories that
allow one-to-one correspondences between risks and returns.
• If the decomposition is finer than the optimal one, a partial solution is found
(only some numbers are guessed correctly). However, during the initial tri-
als the partial solution may perform better than the complete solution. Thus,
the solution may be crowded out by partial solutions that perform better in
the short run. In our context, this means that too many sub-aspects may
impair the bank from finding the optimal arrangement of aspects, precisely
because they enable it to reach an acceptable arrangement quickly.
These results suggest that much of the quest that banks have undertaken for
distinguishing aspects and sub-aspects may have been motivated by the need of
having a classification system in place before their rivals had one, rather than by
the goal of optimizing lending procedures. Speed in decision-making on loan
applications may have been attained, but at the cost of worsening the quality of
decision-making.
Other simulations on problem-solving were made, where the solution was al-
lowed to change with time [28] [14] [42]. In this setting, the problem-solver
must chase a solution that escapes any attempt to be reached. In these simula-
tions coarse decompositions performed best, since by allowing longer jumps in
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the space of solutions they enabled the problem-solver to approach the solution
from time to time, albeit she may remain far from it most of the times.
This result may suggest that those credit institutions that are most often con-
cerned with financing innovative projects should not subdivide their judgement
into a large number of “aspects” and “sub-aspects”. However, we have seen in
this section that venture capitalists seem to do the opposite, i.e., they consider
several aspects, subdivide them into a large number of sub-aspects and are keen
of explaining their classification criteria to researchers.
A possible explanation might be that what venture capitalists actually do, is
not what they claim or think that they do. Indeed, a stream of literature questions
the results obtained by simply asking venture capitalists what their classification
criteria are. In fact, although the main aspects considered by venture capitalists are
really those that best indicate the future evolution of a business venture [49], too
many aspects may decrease the judgement efficiency of venture capitalists [59].
In reality, venture capitalists may employ just a few of the many aspects that they
mention [52]. Indeed, theoretical considerations suggest that it may be rational
for a decision-maker to ignore some information if this increases her likelihood to
make mistakes [34].
Further insights could be gained by a better understanding of the processes
of problem decomposition. For the moment, it is clear that the processes actually
used in order to change classification criteria are much more difficult to understand
than the mere decision not to grant a loan.
6 Conclusion
Credit rationing is one of those issues where the neoclassical model of competitive
markets does not apply. Similarly to other market failures, asymmetric informa-
tion has been suggested as an explanation.
Since asymmetric information is sufficient to justify the existence of credit
rationing, little effort has been devoted to alternative, or additional explanations.
Though a few economists voiced that uncertainty does play a role in credit ra-
tioning, this argument has not been pursued in either empirical or analytical terms.
The empirical evidence on credit rationing to high-tech firms is questioning
this approach, since there is no reason why information asymmetries should be
higher if sophisticated technologies are involved. Furthermore, the new accord
on capital requirements (Basel II) is emphasising the importance of bank inter-
nal rating systems, a circumstance that triggered many interesting empirical in-
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vestigations. Both streams of enquiry point to the difficulties posed by difficult
classification problems, and this issue needs to be faced.
Credit rationing due to classification failure does not have the same dynami-
cal properties as credit rationing due to information asymmetries. In fact, credit
rationing due to information asymmetries is likely to be constant with time, for in-
formation asymmetries exist all the time. On the contrary, credit rationing due to
classification failures is stronger when uncertainty is high because important nov-
elties are emerging. Often, this happens at crisis times, just when it would be most
important that firms can access credit. Thus, credit rationing due to classification
failure has important consequences for economic dynamics.
Credit rationing due to classification failures suggests that economic policy is
not just a matter of managing money, but also a matter of providing economic ac-
tors with visions, confidence, and directions for the future. The mappings between
classes of risk and classes of return that we used to explain credit rationing are a
representation of cognitive states, and as such, they are subject to persuasion.
A Cognitive Maps in the Biotech Industry
Mappings from classes of risk to classes of return exist in the minds of the bank
officials who make decisions regarding loans. Essentially, they are instances of
cognitive maps.
A cognitive map provides orientation by telling a decision-maker what it is
‘normal’ for him to expect. It is a set of causal relationships that link a set of
possible causes with a set of possible effects.
It is important to realize that mental categories do not evolve independently of
the cognitive map in which they are embedded. Rather, mental categories are con-
structed in order to fit into a particular cognitive map. In its turn, a cognitive map
is arranged with the purpose of making the causal links between mental categories
as simple as possible.
As an illustrative example, the following figures (6) and (7) tell the story of a
change of the cognitive map of U.S. biotech companies as has been recorded by
their industry association [35].
Since its products take years to reach the market, and since commercialization
requires a sales and marketing organization that is beyond the reach of small high-
tech firms, biotech companies cannot draw their revenues from consumers. Thus,
they establish strategic alliances with large pharmaceutical companies that ad-
vance the capital for R&D in exchange of patents. As can be seen from figure (6),
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Figure 6: A part of the cognitive map of American dedicated biotech companies in
1989 (Amgen and Genentech are the two most successful companies). Incoming
arrows stem from parts of the map not shown in this figure. By courtesy of Gail
James c©, expounded from [35].
in 1989 biotech companies saw this process as sustaining their independence al-
beit at the cost of hindering expansion through vertical integration.
One year later, 1990, biotech companies suddenly realized that pharmaceutical
companies were acquiring sensible knowledge that would enable them to develop
in-house biotechnologies and, most importantly, that contracts were so tightly
written that biotech companies could not transfer the expertise that they developed
through a collaboration with a pharmaceutical company onto other fields. Biotech
companies defined strategic alliances with pharmaceutical companies as “poison
pills”. Figure (7) shows that their cognitive map changed dramatically.
The cognitive map of 1989 provided a positive orientation to the future that
suggested biotech companies to invest and banks to concede loans. Suddenly,
in 1990, the certainties of the 1989 map disappeared. There was no longer a
clear direction of what to do, no long-term strategy embedded in causal relations
connecting what can be done to what can be obtained. The figures (2) and (3) of
§ (3) are sketchy representations of a cognitive map that provides certainties and
a cognitive map that offers none, respectively.
The rest of the story is that biotech companies realized that by writing proper
contracts their independence could be safeguarded; at the same time, pharma-
ceutical companies realized that independent biotech companies guarantee edge
research. Thus, in the end the cognitive maps of biotech companies since 1991 re-
turned to pretty much what they used to be prior to 1990, except that a concept was
included, specifying that strategic alliances should be flexible and contemplate an
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Figure 7: A part of the cognitive map of American dedicated biotech companies
in 1990. Incoming arrows stem from parts of the map not shown in this figure. By
courtesy of Gail James c©, expounded from [35].
exit clause.
As explained above, the maps shown in figures (6) and (7) were expunged
from official communications of the industrial association of biotech companies.
Thus, they reflect the prevailing opinion in this industrial sector at that time. We
can safely assume that banks generally conformed to this opinion.
Now suppose that a biotech company re-gained, or never lost its confidence
in the future while banks were still confused. For instance, a particular biotech
company and its pharmaceutical partner may have recognized their mutual inter-
dependence earlier than the rest of the industry, while banks were still reluctant to
conceive the possibility of a long-term accord between these subjects. This firm
would have probably suffered credit rationing, even if both the firm and its bank
had the same information. It all depends on how this information was arranged in
their cognitive maps.
B The Measurement of Complexity
This appendix provides an example of complexity measurement. Figures (8)
and (9) illustrate a possible map between classes of risk and returns and the cor-
responding simplicial complex, respectively.
A simplex is the convex hull of a set of (n + 1) independent points in some
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Euclidean space of dimension n or higher, that are its vertices. In plain language,
a simplex is the n-dimensional analogue of a triangle. For example, a 0-simplex
is a point, a 1-simplex is a line segment, a 2-simplex is a triangle, a 3-simplex is a
tetrahedron, a 4-simplex is a pentachoron, etc.
Let us represent classes of risk as simplices whose vertices are the classes of
return to which they are connected. So a class of risk is represented by a point
if it is connected to one single class of return, a segment if it is connected to two
classes of return, a triangle if it is connected to three classes of return, and so on.
In the case of figure (8) simplices are either points, or segments, or triangles,
and a tetrahedron. In fact, the simplex r1 is made by its only vertex R1, the simplex
r7 is made by its only vertex R7, and the simplex r9 is made by its only vertex R9.
On the contrary, the simplex r4 is the segment connecting vertices R4 and R5, and
the simplex r8 is the segment connecting vertices R8 and R9. The simplex r2 is a
triangle of vertices R1, R2, R3, the simplex r3 is a triangle of vertices R2, R3, R4,
and the simplex r5 is a triangle of vertices R5, R6, R7. Finally, the simplex r6 is a
tetrahedron of vertices R6, R7, R8 and R9.
We do not care about the size of simplices. Rather, we focus on the structure
of their connections.
The convex hull of any non-empty subset of the (n + 1) points that define a
simplex is called a face of the simplex. In particular, 0-faces are the vertices of a
simplex, 1-faces are segments, and the n-face is the simplex itself. Two simplices
are connected if they have a common face. A set of (at least) pairwise connected
simplices is a simplicial complex.
In our example, simplices r1 and r2 have vertex R1 as their common face,
simplices r2 and r3 have the segment R2 −R3 as their common face, simplices
r3 and r4 have common vertex R4, simplices r4 and r5 have common vertex R5,
simplices r5 and r6 have the segment R6 −R7 in common, simplices r5, r6 and
r7 share the vertex R7, simplices r6 and r8 have the vertex R8 in common and
simplices r8 and r9 have vertex R9 in common. Each simplex is connected to at
least one other simplex, so they form one single simplicial complex as illustrated
in figure (9). Note that some simplices are included in others (r1 is included in r2;
r7 is included in both r5 and r6; r8 and r9 are included in r6).
In the simplicial complex of figure (9) there is one class of simplices connected
at q = 0 (the class {r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,r6,r7,r8,r9}, because each of these simplices
have at least one vertex in common with another simplex in the class). Further-
more, there are two classes of simplices connected at q = 1 (the class {r2,r3},
because r2 and r3 have the segment R2 −R3 in common, and the class {r5,r6},
because r5 and r6 have the segment R6−R7 in common).
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Figure 8: A map between classes of risk and classes of return. Each class of risk
corresponds to a simplex whose vertices are the classes of return to which it is
connected.
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Figure 9: The simplicial complex corresponding to the map of figure (8). The
dotted line represents the hidden edge of tetrahedron r6, whose vertices are R6,
R7, R8 and R9.
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Thus, it is s0 = 1 and s1 = 2. With these numbers, eq. (1) yields C (F ;m,n) =
1.5.
In the above example it was n = 9. The choice of the correct memory length
m did not appear in the example because it determines the map which, in fig-
ure (8), was assumed to be given. However, the rationales for its choice are worth
mentioning.
Complexity is due to qualitative features and causal relationships that surprise
the observer as absolutely novel. It follows that only recent information is rele-
vant, and only qualitatively, not quantitatively. This is one general reason for a
small m.
Furthermore, there exists a criterion to determine how small m must be with
respect to the information on which complexity is computed. When calculating
complexity, one does not care whether a causal connection occurred one, two,
three times or more, but only if it ever occurred, or not. Thus, it does not make
sense to have more than one or two repetitions of a particular connection. If this
occurs, this means that m is too large. And too large an m produces too high
complexity values.
Further details on the computation of complexity can be found in [25], [26]
and [27].
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